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Abstract: This paper argues that the ideas that win out in economics are not necessarily 
those that a representative researcher would choose, but are rather the emergent result of 
the competition of ideas in which system replicator dynamics dominate. This means that 
those ideas that fit the analytic technology available to researchers at the time dominate, 
while “better” ideas that do not offer advancement to researchers lose out. This paper 
spells out that view. It differentiates a consumer’s understanding of theory from a 
producer’s understanding of theory, and argues that a consumer’s understanding of theory 
is often better suited to applied policy than is a producer’s understanding of theory. 
Because the replicator dynamics of the economics profession does not reward people for 
acquiring a consumer’s understanding of theory, that understanding is often neglected. 
Heterodox economists often have a better consumer’s understanding of theory than do 
mainstream economists but because they do not prepare students to be successful in 
economic institutional environment, their views do not receive the hearing they should in 
the profession. The paper offers a number of suggestions for heterodox European macro 
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  Over the past 80 years macroeconomic theory has gone through 
some remarkable transformations—the Keynesian revolution, the neo-
Keynesian revolution, the New Classical revolution, the real business cycle 
revolution, the New Keynesian reaction to that New Classical revolution, 
and most recently the DSGE synthesis revolution, which essentially studies 
macro economy as a dynamic stochastic optimal control problem facing a 
representative agent. Currently, we have, as Robert Solow (2008) nicely 
summarized it, a dominant mainstream macroeconomic theory that tries to 
understand the macroeconomic problems as a “representative agent, 
infinite-horizon, intertemporal-optimization-with-conventional-constraints 
story with its various etceteras.” According to Solow, and I agree, this story 
is essentially a “rhetorical swindle” that the “macro community has 
perpetrated on itself, and its students” (Solow 2008: 235)  
  I have recounted the history of how we got to where we are in macro 
elsewhere (Colander 1988, 1998, 2006, Colander/Landreth 1996) so I am 
only going to provide a summary of my arguments here. Similarly, I have 
also written at length about the shortcomings of the current DSGE theory, 
(Colander 1996, 2006, Colander et. al. 2008) and have suggested that in its 
place macro economists follow what I call a Post Walrasian approach, 
which is an approach that sees the macro economy as a complex system in 
which the interesting policy issues stem from complex dynamics of 
adaptive interactive agents. This Post Walrasian approach makes learning 
dynamics, interactions of agents, and the dynamic feedback among decision 
makers—aspects that the DSGE model assumes away--essential elements of 
the theory. 
  The technical analytic tools to deal formally with such complex 
systems dynamics, such as ultrametrics and dimensional cluster analysis 
(Aoki/Yoshikawa 2006) are extraordinarily complicated—and even these 
tools are likely far too simple to shed much definitive light on complex 
systems. Thus, I have also advocated that that analytic approach should be 
supplemented by an ACE (agent-based computable economics) modeling How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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approach, (Tesfatsion/Judd 2006) in which one creates a virtual macro 
economy within one’s computer, and studies the economy by experimenting 
with these virtual macro economies. Macro properties are seen as properties 
that emerge as discernable patterns that owe their existence to the system’s 
complex dynamics. Work is progressing on these approaches, with 
European macro economists, who have been less affected by the “rhetorical 
swindle” than have US economists, leading the way. Unfortunately, both 
these approaches are in the beginning stages; they yield little in the way of 
policy insights and little in the way of formal analytic conclusions that are 
scalable to a real world economy. 
1. Macro Theory’s Role in Policy 
  Given the current state of macro theory, I think the most honest 
approach is to accept that we have to conduct macro policy without a formal 
scientific theory to guide us. I see the current field of macro as an 
engineering field in which the best we can hope for are loose laws to guide 
policy that follow from common sense and empirical studies. Currently, 
macroeconomics is not a scientific field in which we have a firm theoretical 
foundation.  
This does not mean that there is no role for technical work in macro 
policy analysis. Some of these loose engineering laws can be discerned 
through statistical analysis, such as the cointegrated vector auto regression 
approach used by Katarina Juselius (2005). Her approach, which I find 
highly appealing, is based on careful statistical work and educated common 
sense application of macroeconomic theory. This Juselius approach is not 
an a-theoretical approach, but rather an approach in which the role of theory 
and empirical work are reversed from the normal “theory-first” way US 
macro economists think. By that I mean that it places empirical work first. It 
finds patterns in the data--and uses theory as a guide to interpret and discern 
those patterns. 
1.1 An Intelligent Consumer’s Understanding of Theory 
  The Juselius approach to macroeconomics sees macro policy 
analysis as a highly sophisticated art that requires high level statistical skills 
and a deep understanding of theoretical ideas. The needed deep theoretical 
understanding is, however, an “intelligent consumer’s” understanding, not a How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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“producer’s” understanding of the formal theory. The two are quite different 
types of understanding. An “intelligent consumer’s understanding” is an 
understanding of not only the technical arguments, but also of its limitations 
both as a scientific theory and as a guide to policy. A consumer of theory is 
not concerned with the intricacies of theory, but rather with the applicability 
of the theory to policy. Economists with a consumer’s knowledge of theory 
are not economic scientists trying make contributions to the technical 
development of the formal model, they are political economists who are 
directly interested in applying theory to policy
1 Put another way an 
“intelligent consumer’s understanding” of theory is a Charles Goodhart 
understanding.
2 An intelligent consumer may or may not be able to produce 
the model, but he or she has the ability to understand it and its implications 
for policy.  
A producer’s understanding of a theory is different; a producer 
doesn’t need to know the limitations of a theory for policy. Instead, he must 
know the technical aspects of the model intricately. In fact, it might be 
better if a producer doesn’t really know the limitations of the theory 
because that knowledge might reduce his or her incentive for producing the 
theory. It certainly did mine, and I suspect that it has kept many macro 
economists from working on DSGE models. 
1.2 Heterodox Economists Tend to have a Consumer’s Understanding. 
  I suspect that most economists in this audience would generally 
agree with my assessment of DSGE models and of the need for a 
                                                 
1 This distinction between economic science and political economy is to be found in 
Robbins’ work, and his famous essay that gave us the current definition of economics was 
a definition of economic science, not political economy. (Colander, forthcoming-a)  
2 By that I mean that while Charles Goodhart has not developed his arguments about 
money and uncertainty within a formal theoretical framework, his writings demonstrate a 
deep awareness of the insights that follow from formal economic theory, along with the 
insights of many other theoretical frameworks. In terms of drawing policy conclusions I 
would rely on his understanding of DSGE theory over that of most, if not all, producers of 
that theory. His writings convey wisdom. Goodhart is not the only economist who exhibits 
such wisdom. I could have, for instance, called it a Charles Kindleberger, Leland Yeager, 
or Herbert Stein type of understanding of the theory. Economists can, of course, have both 
a consumer’s and a producer’s understanding of theory. Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow 
are examples of economists who excel in both areas. Such economists are rare. How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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complexity approach to macro, although, I am sure, that since this is an 
academic audience, they will likely have many complaints and problems 
with particular elements of my arguments. In any case, for sake of argument 
I assume that my description of the audience is right and that you share my 
assessment of the DSGE model’s application to policy as a “rhetorical 
swindle.” I also assume, for sake of this talk, that we are right. This means 
that I am asserting that the collective wisdom of a group of heterodox-
leaning economists, such as we have at this conference, provides a better 
guide to policy than is being provided by the collective wisdom of the 
producers of the mainstream DSGE macro model.
3 If that is true, and I 
think it is, it raises the question: Why aren’t the ideas of the people in this 
room the dominant ideas in macroeconomics? Shouldn’t the best ideas win 
out? 
2. Macroeconomic Thought as an Emergent Phenomenon 
  My explanation for why the best policy ideas are not winning out in 
macro lies in my conception of the economics profession, a conception that 
differs from the way most economists think about the economics profession. 
The dominant approach to understanding the profession, used by almost all 
historians of economic thought and heterodox economists (I don’t include 
mainstream economists because they don’t really think about such 
methodological issues), is what might be called the representative 
researcher approach. It is an approach that sees macroeconomic thought as 
                                                 
3 To put some specificity to my argument I am using the Chari/Kohoe (2006) discussion of 
the policy implications of the DSGE model as representative of the policy thinking of 
producers of the modern DSGE mainstream. They write “The message of examples like 
these is that discretionary policy making has only costs and no benefits, so that if 
government policymakers can be made to commit to a policy rule, society should make 
them do so. (pp 7-8) and “Macroeconomists can now tell policymakers that to achieve 
optimal results, they should design institutions that minimize the time inconsistency 
problem by promoting a commitment to policy rules. However, to what particular policies 
should policymakers commit themselves? For many macroeconomists considering this 
question, quantitative general equilibrium models have become the workhorse model, and 
they turn out to offer surprisingly sharp answers. (page 9)  
As I believe will be obvious to most, if not all, of the heterodox macro economists 
here, the “collective wisdom” bar to which I am comparing your collective wisdom to is 
not set too high. To be fair to mainstream economic theorists, had I chosen Michael 
Woodford or Robert Lucas, both of whom are far more circumspect about drawing policy 
implications from the DSGE model, the comparison would have been much more difficult.  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
6 10/7/2009 
if it were the product of a single representative researcher who is searching 
for the truth.  
  Within this representative researcher framework it is only natural to 
think of mainstream macro theory as representing, if not the truth, at least 
the best approximation of the truth that researchers have found. If that 
representative researcher doesn’t choose the “truth” when it is available, it 
must either be because he or she is not searching for it because of an 
ideological bias, or because he or she is stupid. Most heterodox economists 
attribute both characteristics to mainstream macroeconomists.  
  I think both characterizations are wrong. In my view, mainstream 
macro economists who work on DSGE models are extremely smart and are 
no more, and probably less, ideological than the representative heterodox 
economists.
4 (Heterodox economists generally only achieve an ideological 
neutrality by offsetting ideological views of the right heterodoxy with the 
left heterodoxy.) So neither stupidity nor ideology is my explanation. 
Instead, my explanation is that the representative researcher approach to 
thinking about the evolution of macro theory is not the way to understand 
the economics profession. 
  Just as I take a complexity approach to macro, I take a complexity 
approach to understanding the economics profession. I see the field of 
economics as a complex evolving system, consisting of many different 
competing ideas at all times. This means that in the mainstream, there is no 
single orthodoxy; there is, instead, a plurodoxy of ideas all competing 
within a set of rules that determine which researchers advance and which do 
not. The “mainstream view” thus is not a view held by any one in the 
mainstream, but is instead a composite view that emerges. Because good 
policy analysis does not enter significantly into the replicator dynamics of 
the profession, the policy view of the producers of theory does not 
necessarily imply a deep consumer’s understanding of theory. We can ferret 
out a mainstream policy view, but that view is not necessarily the product of 
careful conscious thought of any individual producer since mainstream 
macroeconomic theorists are primarily concerned with science, not policy. 
                                                 
4 See Colander, (2005a) for a discussion of this issue. How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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  As a way to do science I support this mainstream approach of 
separating policy from theory—if someone is going to get the science right, 
their policy views are likely to get in their way. Science is about 
understanding, not policy. This means that to the degree one is going to 
have a formal theoretical model, the model one uses is going to be driven by 
the available analytical techniques. In my view the DSGE model, just like 
the general equilibrium model, is a substantial intellectual achievement in 
the science of macroeconomics. The problem comes when the producers of 
this theory apply it to policy without taking into account the fact that its 
assumptions were chosen on the basis of analytic tractability, not policy 
applicability. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know that the DSGE model 
is just not especially relevant for guiding macro economic policy, but it 
does take someone with a consumer’s understanding of theory, so anytime I 
hear a producer of macro theory making pronouncements about theory 
based only, or even primarily, on the DSGE model, I know that they are not 
a trained consumer of economic theory.  
Within my complexity approach to understanding the profession, the 
structure of scientific models being worked on at any particular time is 
largely determined by analytic and computing technology available to the 
researcher. Producers of theoretical macro models continually innovate, 
bringing in the latest analytical technological and computational 
technologies to the existing model. As they do, they succeed in the 
academic institutional environment. Succeeding means not only advancing 
but also getting graduate students or colleagues who continue their work. 
How well the scientific theory fits policy issues is only a minor factor in a 
scientific theory’s success. Policy is not its purpose; it’s purpose is 
understanding. In judging the policy usefulness of current scientific 
theories, there is no reason why producers of scientific theories are better 
than non-producers, and they likely worse than educated consumers of 
scientific theories, who have focused their study on policy relevance of 
theory.  
3. How Macro Policy Analysis got so Far off track 
The crux of my argument of how macro policy analysis got so far 
off track is that modern economics institutions structures promote and 
advance economists on the basis of their success as producers of science, 
and not on the basis of their success as consumers of science. Within such How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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an institutional environment the training that is central to using a theory 
correctly gets shortchanged. Specifically, the institutional setting of 
economics in the US, (which alas, is becoming the institutional setting of 
Europe as well) which has a strong focus on a quality-weighted journal 
article publishing metric, does not reward and advance political economists. 
In fact, they are weeded out of the profession, or at least are not advanced in 
the profession. Some become heterodox economists. Others become minor 
mainstream economists.  
Most thoughtful economic scientists recognize the problems with 
the policy pronouncements of the less-than-thoughtful economic scientists, 
but they generally stay out of the debate since they know their training is as 
an economic scientist, not as a political economist. This means that the 
perceived composite mainstream view of policy is skewed, and does not 
reflect the thoughtful mainstream position of policy since that thoughtful 
mainstream position does not draw their policy conclusions directly from 
the latest theory. Instead, it reflects the views of the “less-than-thoughtful” 
economic scientists. 
  The situation was not always like this. The journal article metric is a 
recent phenomenon, and it became central in the US only in the 1970s, and 
is only now becoming central in Europe. Before that time a consumer’s 
knowledge of theory was more highly valued than it is today, and was less 
separated from a producer’s knowledge. One reason for this is that the 
technical aspects of theories were less sophisticated earlier, so less technical 
specialization was needed.  
But in the 1960s because of both technological changes requiring 
much more research specialization, and institutional changes that gave more 
relative weight to producer’s knowledge, the replicator dynamics of 
economics in the US began to change. The institutional structure starting 
leaning toward selecting and advancing economic scientists with more 
producer’s knowledge over political economists with a consumer’s 
knowledge. Economic science pushed out political economy. Training in 
economics similarly changed; the core of graduate training in the US 
became more focused on teaching technological skills appropriate to 
science. As that occurred, the selection process of who became an 
economist changed, and students with leanings toward consumer knowledge 
became less likely to be admitted to top schools, and those whose How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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proclivities were in political economy, and who still made it into the top 
programs became less likely to advance. In other words, there are fewer 
Charles Goodhart-type economists being created today than there were 40 
years ago.  
4. How Institutional Forces Shaped the History of Macro 
  Thus, my argument is that to understand the prevailing macro theory 
one must understand the forces at work in the advancement and promotion 
of economists. Elsewhere (Colander 1988, 2006) I have explained how 
macroeconomics evolved over the last 70 years in reference to these forces, 
and have argued that what is called the Keynesian revolution was not a 
macro revolution at all. The so-called Keynesian revolution was kept alive 
only by its chameleon nature—its willingness to change to fit the 
technology of the day. My argument is that Keynes had at best, a hazy 
scientific vision of an aggregate economy that was driven by complex 
dynamics, a vision that he felt that the “Classical” macro vision of the time 
had lost. A true scientific Keynesian revolution would have emphasized 
uncertainty, complex dynamics, emergence, nonergodicity, and the fallacy 
of composition central to its models. It would have had, as a core belief, the 
proposition that macroeconomics that was fundamentally different from 
micro. It would have been a macro that had different laws and different 
rules of motion than those we used in microeconomics. There would have 
been no attempt to develop the type of comparative static models that 
became known as Keynesian macro models. That scientific Keynesian 
revolution was stillborn, and was quickly lost.  
Instead of revolutionizing the field, the Keynesian revolution was 
quickly subsumed by and subverted by two other analytic technological 
revolutions—the general equilibrium revolution and an econometric 
revolution both of which pulled theory away from complex dynamics 
because neither were then able to deal with such complex issues. They 
required a much simpler underlying model to be applicable to macro. These 
revolutions, which were part of an ongoing evolution in economics that was 
occurring independent of Keynesian economics would have influenced 
economic thinking whether or not these developments had been placed How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
10 10/7/2009 
under the Keynesian name.
5 They diverted macro economic theory from 
dealing with issues of complex dynamics, and instilled in macro a vision of 
a system with a unique attractor and simple linear dynamics that Marshall 
had used for partial equilibrium micro analysis. In brief, the science of 
macro economics was overpowered by a desire to have policy-relevant 
models that fit the analytic techniques available at the time.  
  The result was a macro theory that most macroeconomists 
recognized was not a scientific theory but which was, at best, a loose 
framework with which to frame macro questions. Because the resulting 
models were concerned with policy, all too often those supposedly scientific 
models became immersed in ideology. For example, the mid 1970s were the 
time of the money matters wars. Somehow, Chicago always came to one 
conclusion, and Yale came to another, both using the same data set. The 
fact that the dynamical foundation of the model didn’t exist or that 
microfoundations were selectively used didn’t bother these 
macroeconomists of the time. They were too busy developing more and 
more complicated models based an illogical core. Doing so advanced their 
careers and led to more people doing similar things. 
Let me be clear to what I am objecting to here. It is not the macro 
models of the time. Much of what was being done in macro at the time 
could have been justified as rough and ready engineering economics 
designed to give policy makers some sense of how to deal with something 
as complex as the macro economy. But macroeconomic theory wasn’t 
presented that way. It was presented as science. That, I think, was 
fundamentally wrong, and it didn’t take a rocket scientist to recognize that it 
was wrong. Anyone with an “educated consumer’s knowledge” of 
economic theory would have realized it. 
It was at that height of the neosynthesis period that I became 
interested in heterodox economics on both the right and the left. Reading 
their work, it seemed clear to me that they had best kept a consumer’s 
understanding of macro, and had not been fooled by neosynthesis pretense 
of science. Heterodox macro economists such as Paul Davidson, kept telling 
                                                 
5 Why all these disparate developments came under the Keynesian moniker is a difficult 
question in social thought, and one that I will not deal with here. I point it out here because 
in order to understand the history of macro one must recognize these disparate elements of 
the Keynesian revolution and that many of these developments worked at cross purposes. How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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the world that the neoclassical/NeoKyensian synthesis had no clothes, and 
should be abandoned. But no one listened. Why?  
My brief answer is that heterodox macro economists failed to 
influence the profession because they did not take into account in their 
decisions the way in which the profession works, and the way in which 
ideas advance and develop within the profession. They thought that the 
truth would win out just because it was the truth. Then, when the truth as 
they saw it did not win out, they separated themselves from the profession 
and created their own subgroups—Post Keynesian, Austrian, and 
Institutionalists--and started communicating solely within their subgroup. In 
short, they became heterodox. As that happened, they no longer influenced 
the profession, allowing an even larger deviation between a consumer’s 
understanding and a producer’s understanding of theory.  
5. What Can European heterodox economists do to get it back on 
track? 
Let me now expand on that brief answer and provide my answer to 
the second question—what can European heterodox macro economists do to 
get it back on track? My answer to this second question is embodied in the 
above arguments—to get macro back on track one has to develop an 
institutional framework that values a consumer’s understanding of theory as 
well as a producer’s understanding of theory. To do that one has to play a 
role in shaping the quickly changing mainstream European economics 
institutional environment. This is the essence of my argument today. 
Success of ideas depends on success within the profession, and it is far 
more important for the heterodox economics community to work on 
succeeding in the mainstream institutional structure than it is to further 
develop their specific ideas. 
Let me give some specific suggestions.
6 
•  Be Economists, not Heterodox economists  
There is one important conversation in economics, and that’s the 
mainstream conversation. Almost by definition, heterodox economists don’t 
                                                 
6 A more substantial discussion of these suggestions, along with some other ones can be 
found in Colander (forthcoming-b).  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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compete in the mainstream environment. They create their own 
conferences, their own journals, their own graduate programs and their own 
conversation. I have nothing against starting a separate conversation per se. 
As an incubator for new ideas, it can be helpful. But if it develops a separate 
conversation, and research program, it had better provide jobs for the young 
researchers either by colonizing an ever larger portion of the teaching area, 
or by making its ideas desirable to the mainstream. The reason this is 
fundamentally important is that success of a program takes multiple 
generations—it is incumbent on any group to not just make arguments but 
to develop an institutional structure in which their students and others who 
agree with them can flourish. This is something that heterodox economists 
have failed at. Essentially heterodox economists have eaten up their seed 
capital, leaving an institutional environment within which their followers 
have an increasingly difficult time of propagating. 
I am, of course, sympathetic to those heterodox economists who 
want to stay out of the mainstream debate. Ideas need nurturing, and the 
environment for ideas within mainstream economics is unfriendly. Its 
requirement that ideas be formally modeled makes it hard for novel ideas to 
develop. Heterodox economics communities provide an incubator 
environment within which ideas can germinate and sprout. They are 
wonderful idea incubators, which allow people to have more friendly critics 
around, who treat their ideas more gently than the would be treated in 
mainstream economics. This gentle treatment gives the ideas a chance to 
germinate and perhaps even to sprout.  
The problem is that ideas cannot remain in the incubator forever, 
and for the heterodox communities to serve the function of incubator, it 
must transfer the idea, developed in heterodoxy, up to the mainstream. All 
too often, what happens with ideas developed in heterodox economics is 
that they remain in their incubator and do not cross-pollinate with 
mainstream ideas. Both heterodox and mainstream economics are worse off 
for it.  
To make the transfer of a scientific idea from the heterodox 
incubator to the mainstream, the ideas must be developed in a formal model 
and buttressed by technical empirical work. Transferring the often vague 
heterodox ideas to such models is difficult; often, the reason the mainstream 
has shied away from the complicated issues that heterodox economists see How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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as important is that mainstream economists thought the issues were 
intractable given the existing tools. This is an important point—tools govern 
what can be done scientifically, and the fact that mainstream economists are 
not looking at an issue does not mean that they believe such issues are 
unimportant. It just means that the analytic technology does not yet exist to 
deal with such questions. This leads me to my second suggestion. 
•  Give the Mainstream its Due. 
I often hear from my heterodox friends that the economics profession is 
closed to their views. I totally disagree. As I stated above, the mainstream 
profession is what I call a plurodoxy, not an orthodoxy. They are open to 
ideas if those ideas show a complete understanding of the reasons the 
mainstream is doing what it is doing, and of the theory. Good mainstream 
economists know the problems with their theory; but they also operate 
within the methodological rules of the profession. You are not telling them 
anything new when you make arguments that the macro economy is 
nonergodic, that one needs a non-linear dynamic model to describe events, 
that stochastic is different than uncertain, or that the representative agent 
model misses important elements of reality. If you think you are, then you 
are fooling yourself.  
The problems that heterodox economists point out are recognized by the 
good mainstream—they are not new insights. If one has ever talked with 
Robert Lucas or Tom Sargent, you will know that they are deep thinkers. 
Just take a look at Sargent’s latest work on self-confirming equilibrium. 
(Sargent 2007) The good mainstream economists have thought of most of 
the problems that heterodox economists have thought of and then some. But 
they are also playing by producer’s of theory rules, which makes them limit 
their formal work to available techniques. They are pushing the empirical 
and analytic limits as far as possible. Moreover, good mainstream 
macroeconomists have an enormously impressive consumer’s 
understanding of theory. (Some, of course, do not.) The good ones who 
don’t have that consumer’s understanding could likely acquire it if they 
were pushed. Generally, they are not pushed because those heterodox 
economists who could push them don’t enter the mainstream conversation. 
•  See mathematicians and technical economists as your allies, not 
your nemesis.  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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Mainstream economic science is a formal modeling field; it is not going 
to change. It has chosen to study the issues it has because the tools it has 
available could be used to shed light on those issues. Advanced 
mathematicians can bring in new ideas because they have new ways of 
looking at issues that mainstream economists know are important, but shy 
away from because they don’t have the techniques to handle them. Thus, 
there is a natural symbiosis of heterodox economics with advanced applied 
mathematicians and statisticians. That symbiosis has not been developed, in 
part because heterodox economists have been anti-math. In my view 
heterodox economists should be precisely the opposite—they should 
welcome higher and higher levels of mathematical and statistical 
formalization into economics because that is what will allow the formal 
consideration of the issues they want considered.  
Most heterodox economists don’t have the skills to do that formal 
mathematical work, and, for those who don’t have them, I am not arguing 
that they should develop them. They should see themselves as political 
economist, not economics scientists. But I am arguing that all heterodox 
economists who want to take part in the scientific debate in economics 
should have a consumer’s understanding of what is going on in high-level 
mathematics and statistics, with an eye to see if new analytic techniques 
may be able to address some of the issues they believe should be addressed. 
They should be looking to do joint work with ultra mathematicians and ultra 
statisticians, because only they have the skills to do the work formally. 
These “ultras” often find mainstream economists far too rigid for their 
tastes, and have a deep interest in entering the economics debate. Working 
with heterodox economists provides an entre for them into economic 
debates.  
•  Worry less about methodology.  
Most heterodox economists don’t work with formal mathematical 
models; instead they focus on methodological issues. I think that is a 
mistake. Unless he or she is a philosopher specializing in methodology, just 
about everything to be said about methodology has been said. To think that 
anyone but a specialist is going to have much to add on methodology is 
similar to a neophyte thinking he can do better than an index fund in 
investing.  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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Instead of complaining or discussing methodological problems, a 
heterodox economist could be working on specific institutional problems 
that both underlie and affect methodology, such as creating an alternative 
ranking system. If the current ranking system does not put heterodox 
research in an appropriate light, he or she could develop a research agenda 
designed to create an alternative ranking system that does, and explain why 
it is a better system. There are many foibles with the current ranking 
systems, especially as a ranking system for economists who are primarily 
teachers of economics, or whose interests are in hands-on applied policy 
and political economy. Heterodox interests fit much better into what 
undergraduate teaching needs and were a separate “teaching-oriented” 
ranking system developed, heterodox economists would come out much 
better in the rankings.  
•  Don’t dwell on unfairness.  
If there is to be a dialog between heterodox and mainstream 
economists it has to originate from heterodox economists. The mainstream 
has the power, and has little incentive to give it up, and for the most part is 
totally unaware of the existence of a heterodoxy even existing. Heterodox 
economists today find themselves in precarious positions, and are being 
squeezed out institutionally both in the U.S. and in Europe. Is it fair that 
most of the effort toward communication will have to be on the heterodox 
economist’s side? Absolutely not. But so what? Regardless of how unfair 
the profession is to you, it does not help to feel sorry for yourself.  
I fully agree, heterodox economists are discriminated against and ill-
treated. But complaining about it will not change the situation when the 
other side has the power. So, I see no other option than to live with it. If you 
define your role in a way that allows you to succeed within the institutions 
that exist, you have more of a chance of changing the institutions than you 
do if you are marginalized. That’s why I do not see it as especially helpful 
to distinguish oneself as a heterodox economist, and not just as an 
economist who has certain beliefs. To differentiate oneself as heterodox 
places one in opposition to an orthodoxy that the mainstream doesn’t 
believe exists, and thereby reduces the possibility of communication with 
the very people who I believe heterodox economists should be 
communicating with.  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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•  Concentrate on areas where you can make a difference.  
As I have argued in Colander (2005a) economics textbooks are far 
from consistent with much of the latest thinking in the profession. One of 
the reasons textbooks are inconsistent with the best thinking in the 
profession is that the mainstream does not focus on teaching or pedagogy. 
This lack of concern about teaching by the mainstream leaves an opening 
for economists who are interested in a consumer’s understanding of theory, 
which includes most heterodox economists. By addressing their arguments 
to the narrow issue of what economists teach in their textbooks, and how 
they can do it better, heterodox economists are on much firmer ground, and 
can get a better hearing from mainstream journals. Economists receive 
much of the funding they do because of their teaching. Given its 
importance, there should be ten times as much research on what it is we 
teach, and why we teach it, than there is. It is a wide open area where 
heterodox economists to make a contribution without placing themselves in 
opposition to mainstream economists.  
I don’t try to make any contributions to the science of 
macroeconomics. It is out of my area of expertise. But I do try to make 
contributions to political economy, and to the teaching of economics. I 
study the organization of the economics profession. For the most part, the 
mainstream has accepted that area of specialization; they don’t see me in 
opposition to the mainstream—they just see me as a little bit weird—what 
one reviewer called the mainstreams economists’ court jester—who is 
allowed to say what everyone knows but has better sense than to say it. 
Thus, when they need a token heterodox economist, they often call on me, 
just as when heterodox economists need a token mainstream economist they 
often call on me. (I am the only white male protestant token that I know.)  
•  Think carefully about how your approach can succeed for both you 
and your students in the institutional environment you are in. 
I saved my most important recommendation for last. Within my 
emerging complex system understanding of the profession, success depends 
less on the truth and insightfulness of an idea—many ideas can be true and 
insightful--and more on the replicator dynamics of the profession. Ideas that 
develop are the ideas of those economists, and their students, who are 
institutionally successful. Thus a necessary precondition of furthering one’s How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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ideas is figuring out what leads to success in the environment. One must 
have a reasonable plan for doing well within that environment. For 
European economists at this time, I believe this issue is especially 
important.  
The reason I say this is because, while the US economics 
institutional environment is relatively fixed, the European environment is 
not. It is in the process of change. Any group of economists interested in 
spreading their economic ideas should, in my view, be spending as much 
time figuring out how to influence that environment, as they do working on 
extending their ideas. That means that they should become actively 
involved with the emerging European economics organizations; they should 
work to combine the regional economic organizations with the European 
economics organizations. From talking with European economists, I believe 
that only a minority want to adopt US institutional structures. But that is 
what is happening. All European heterodox economists should be working 
together collectively to have their voice heard as a necessary voice in 
mainstream economics.  
For example, here in Europe there is a new European Economic 
Association. It is, in principle, controlled by the members, but in practice it 
is controlled by a small group of mainstream economists whose goal seems 
to be to make European economics much more like US economics. These 
are good economists who care about economics. They are open in their 
views. They are also, almost all, economic scientists who have forgotten 
that political economy is an important subcomponent of the field of 
economics, and needs to be nurtured as well. Their sense is that heterodox 
economists, and others who do not want to go along with their changes, 
simply do not understand science or do not want to subject themselves to 
the rigors of intellectual competition.  
I think they are wrong. There are many economists in Europe who 
want to make European economics better, but who disagree with their 
strategy. The problem is that this group has essentially pulled out of EEA. 
Pulling out is, in my view, precisely the wrong strategy, because it removes 
the voice of reason in applying economic theory to policy. Instead of 
pulling out, my view is that heterodox economists should whole-heartedly 
enter into the EEA. They should devote time and energy into creating 
sessions for the meetings and in recruiting members to the organization. How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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They should volunteer to serve on committees and continually be providing 
suggestions for new programs to “broaden” the education and training of 
economists that could get support in the broader mainstream community. 
They should also exercise their right to vote, if need be conducting 
organized write in campaigns for a candidate who shares your views.  
I am not arguing that heterodox economists will be welcomed with 
open arms. But they will be allowed in, and if they are truly the majority, 
they will be given a strong voice. Whereas individual departments don’t 
have to be pluralistic, these organizations of economists must at least appear 
to be. 
6. Conclusion  
My talk has deviated significantly from macroeconomic theory. I 
did so because I think the outlines of what a reasonable modern macro 
theory should be is clear. It is a science of macro that sees macroeconomics 
as falling into the science of a complex systems. Formally analyzing these is 
the domain of ultra mathematicians.  
Modern macro policy has two dimensions. One is a technical policy 
dimension, which is highly dependent on statistical tools. This technical 
policy dimension requires a deep knowledge of cointegrated vector auto-
regression to determine what potential patterns are in the data, along with a 
deep consumer’s knowledge of macroeconomic theory, to determine which 
of those patterns we should be using to guide out policy suggestions. Like 
the science of economics, it is highly technical and requires enormous 
statistical expertise simply to play at it, and then enormous creativity and 
concentrated focus to be able to actually make a contribution.  
For those without that expertise, there is another dimension--the general 
policy dimension. This requires a solid consumer’s understanding of 
modern macro theory, and a consumer’s knowledge of modern statistical 
tools. It is where most professors of economics who are teachers and 
advisors to government will most likely fit. There is much work to be done 
by this group, both in macroeconomic pedagogy, and in policy advice, and 
it complements the developments in the science of economics. The problem 
facing European macroeconomics is developing an institutional structure 
where this each group can specialize in what they are best at.  How Did Macro Get so Far Off Track… 
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